NDN Security

ACM ICN 2018 Tutorial Boston, MA, September 21, 2018

Data Authentication in NDN


Trust Schema


Alex Afanasyev (FIU)

Automating the use of crypto keys via named data


- Use name semantics to enable applications to reason about security, and
- Utilize NDN naming/naming conventions to automate key management in
 - Secure sign-in
 - Certificate issuance
 - Signing and verification
 - Content encryption

Data-Centric Security in NDN





Data Authenticity



Not Just Signature, but Whose Key Signed It?

/home/LivingRoom/VideoFeed
/FrontView/mp4/_frame=12/_chunk=20





A frame from a camera I have installed in my living room /home/LivingRoom/VideoFeed
/FrontView/mp4/_frame=42/_chunk=1



A forged frame pretending to be an image of my living room



Defining Trust Model for My Smart Home

Room's video feed can only come from a camera in the room




Cameras in the room can be configured by someone I have authorized




Only I can authorize users to play with my cameras






Defining Limits via Namespace Design



Restricting Power of Keys



The new key is now restricted to authorize data and operations within the **living room** only

Restricting Power of Keys

/home/Users/Alex/ LivingRoom /KEY/_id=42

signs

/home/LivingRoom/Cameras/CSP750/View/FrontView/KEY/_id=1001

The delegate key is now even more restricted: to publish "camera" data in the living room with a static frontal view

Restricting Power of Keys

/home/LivingRoom/Cameras/CSP750/View/FrontView/KEY/_id=1001




/home/LivingRoom/VideoFeed/FrontView/mp4/_frame=1/...


Camera's key has a very narrow privilege

Trust Schema: Name-Based Definition of Trust Model


A formal language to formally describe trust model

 Schematize data and key name relationships






Schematizing Rules: Specific Restriction




Schematizing Rules: Broader Restriction



User rule (parametrized by Location)

Schematizing Rules: Generalized Restriction




(:Prefix:<>*)<Users>[user](:Location:<>?)<KEY>[key-id]

Can only be signed by

LocalAnchor(Prefix)

User rule (parametrized by Prefix and Location)

Schematizing Rules: Generalized Restriction




```
(:Prefix:<>*)<Users>[user](:Location:<>?)<KEY>[key-id]

Can only be signed by


LocalAnchor(Prefix)
```

User rule (parametrized by Prefix and Location)


Privilege Separation Through Naming



Schematizing Key-Key Naming Rule: Camera




Schematizing Data-Key Naming Rule: VideoFeed



Complete Example of Smart Home Trust Schema

```
(:Prefix:<>*)(:Location:<>?)<VideoFeed>[View]<mp4><frame><chunk>
                                              Camera(Prefix, Location, View)
(:Prefix:<>*)<Cameras>[cam-id](:Location:<>?)<View>[View]<KEY>[key-id]
                                                        User(Prefix, Location)
(:Prefix:<>*)<Users>[user](:Location:<>?)<KEY>[key-id]
                                     LocalAnchor(Prefix)
                                                                        General Trust Model
                   /home/Users/Alex/KEY/_id=1
                                                                    Trust Model Specialization
                                                                         for my smart home
```

Trust Schema as an Automation Tool



Trust Schema Summary

- Hierarchical data/key name relations embed real power
 - Differentiated levels of security and separate privileges

Trust schema influence the application namespace design and is influenced by the namespace design

Enables automation for data validation and signing

Enables automation of NDN certificate management

Demo

Example of simple trust schema in ValidatorConfig ("old") format